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The magic year 1992', or rather the beginning of 1993, has brought to the European 
Community something quite different from what was expected. The changing of the years has 
not seen the complete implementation of the long-awaited single market nor the much desired 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Instead, the new year will start with a fresh round of 
negotiations aimed at the enlargement of the European Community. These are enlargement 
negotiations which, for a long time, were made ultimately dependent on realizing the 
abovementioned projects that have now failed to meet their deadline. In more academic terms, 
it looks as if the debate on the widening' versus the deepening' of the European Community 
has been won by the wideners'. But has it really?
In times past the European Community seemed successful in delaying its enlargement process 
by offering would-be applicant countries something short of EC membership but, nonetheless, 
something to warm their hands on. A whole new dimension has been added to the existing 
arsenal of external policy instruments of the Community. New types of association, trade and 
cooperation agreements have been negotiated that were designed not so much to prepare 
aspirant countries for future EC membership, but to satisfy their basic needs with intermediary 
agreements. Such agreements would require ample time to be implemented, not least of all to 
be negotiated.
Examples of this approach to enlargement are numerous. It finds its expression in Jacques 
Delors' surprise bid to the EFTA countries in January 1989 to create a far-reaching European 
Economic Area (EEA) with common decision-making institutions. It also ies at the heart of 
Commissioner Andriessen's attempt to introduce a model of affiliated membership' or partner-
members' as it has been called more recently.1 The Europe Agreements' with countries in 
Central Europe containing the non-binding reference to future membership should also be 
mentioned in this context. For the CIS republics, the Commission is proposing new 
partnership and cooperation agreements' that are not as broad as the Europe Agreements, but 
more elaborate than the traditional trade and cooperation agreements.
At the same time, the prospect of enlargement has re-emphasized the European Community's 
focus on its own internal integration process. A wider Community, the Commission stated in 
its Lisbon Summit report on enlargement, must not be a dilution of the Community's 
achievements.2 In particular, the EC remained visibly committed to the realization of the 
single market by making its completion by the end of 1992 a condition for future enlargement. 
An enlarged Community that would fail to implement an effective single market, would limit 
the profits that have aroused the interest of potential members in the first place. Moreover, the 
Commission acknowledged that widening must not be at the expense of deepening. Statements 
to this effect had already been made at the European Council in Maastricht where it was first 
pronounced that the accession negotiations could start on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, 
but only after agreement had been reached on the future financing of the EC. Consequently, 
the Lisbon Summit in June 1992 agreed with the main thrust of the Commission's report and 
stated firmly that official negotiations would be opened immediately after the ratification of 
the Maastricht Treaty and once an agreement on its financing, the Delors II' package, had been 
assured.3
It remains to be seen whether the EC's endeavour to slow down the enlargement process has 
been effective by offering intermediary agreements to likely candidates and by giving 
precedence to its internal integration process. The fact is that the number of countries in the 
Community's waiting-room has increased rapidly over the past months. Let us first look at 
how this can be explained. What is the dynamic behind the current flow of applications?
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One explanation is that through their various accords with the EC, the applicant countries 
expose themselves to the Community's commanding acquis communautaire without having a 
say in its formulation. The only way to take part in the shaping of this acquis is by becoming a 
full player in the game; something which the EFTA countries, in particular, have discovered 
throughout the negotiations on the EEA. Whilst it is the Community's acquis that draws 
countries closer to the EC, it is the Community's decision-making autonomy that makes these 
countries finally opt for EC membership. Furthermore, the European Community's strategy to 
enlarge with a group of countries in parallel creates fear among some countries of being left 
outside any particular group. It is not without reason that Cyprus and Malta, two comparably 
small economies in the Mediterranean, applied for EC membership at the same time. Nor is it 
surprising that Finland, Switzerland and Norway have rushed their applications in an effort to 
catch up with the earlier approaches of Austria and Sweden.
To the extent that one can speak of a Community policy on enlargement as outlined above, 
this policy has been largely overtaken by events. The growing queue of countries wishing to 
join the EC is testimony of the Community's inability to freeze the number of applications. 
Moreover, the twelve EC governments decided at the European Council in Edinburgh last 
December to revoke one of their most quoted statements on enlargement. Contrary to what had 
been agreed in Lisbon, the conclusions of the UK Presidency read that enlargement 
negotiations will be opened with Austria, Sweden and Finland at the beginning of 1993; in 
other words before the full ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.4 It is no longer the start of the 
accesion negotiations but the conclusion of those negotiations which has been made dependent 
upon the ratification of the Treaty. The bottom-line argument remains unchanged; no 
Maastricht Treaty, no enlargement. But things are not always what they seem. By opening up 
the official negotiations earlier than anticipated in Lisbon, this new Community approach 
could pave the way to a win-win situation.
First of all, the accession negotiations may push the British government and the people of 
Denmark to ratify the Treaty of Maastricht. Both the United Kingdom and Denmark were once 
full members of EFTA and now take a special interest in welcoming their former associates to 
the EC. By maintaining the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty as a condition for future 
enlargement, the ratification process in these two countries is given an extra incentive. In the 
possible case of non-ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as well, the ongoing negotiations 
with the three EFTA countries will serve a useful purpose. The negotiations might be called to 
the rescue of the Maastricht Treaty by generating pressure on the EC countries to find ways 
out of the impasse. If a settlement is not reached on the Maastricht Treaty itself, then the 
negotiations are likely to spur the search for other means of deepening the Community in order 
to accommodate its future enlargement.  
It is difficult to assess the extent to which this envisioned win-win situation is behind the 
Community's change in position. What is more certain to have been of decisive influence in 
today's EC package-dealing', is the division of national interests. Without disregarding the 
interests of the United Kingdom and Denmark during whose terms of Presidency enlargement 
reached the top of the EC agenda, enlargement has been pushed, notably by the Germans. The 
German interest in a broadened Community stems partly from its troublesome unification 
process. Economically, the German republic would be more than pleased to share its heavy 
financial burden with the richest of applicant countries, viz. the EFTA countries. From a 
geopolitical perspective, broadening of the Community's horizons with countries to the north 
and east would relieve Germany from some of the political over-attention it has been receiving 
as an enlarged major European country.
Other than for reasons of national self-interest, the decision taken at Edinburgh for an early 
opening of the enlargement negotiations was made possible by the solution - at least at EC 
level - of the Danish problem'. In addition, an agreement was reached on the Delors II' 
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package which had been made a condition for further enlargement at the Lisbon Summit along 
with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
Immediately after the opening of the entry negotiations with Austria, Sweden and Finland, the 
newly expressed concern of the European Community has become how to prevent l'Europe à 
la carte. This concern has grown particularly strong in the aftermath of the concessions made 
to the United Kingdom and Denmark in various policy areas of the European Union. A multi-
speed enlargement process is considered imperative, but the idea of different speeds within the 
European Community is unpopular. The basic conditions of EC membership that have been 
singled out by the Commission are merely the tip of the iceberg of what is needed to offset the 
diversity and heterogeneity of a broadened Community.5 Therefore, the European Community 
is now in the business of drawing one line for all applicant countries. No opt-out clauses, no 
safeguard measures, no permanent derogations, will be tolerated. The experience of the EEA 
negotiations has taught us that the EC is very likely to succeed in this respect. With the 
conclusion of the EEA agreement, the EFTA countries have agreed to create new institutions 
whose powers take after their EC equivalents. Back in 1960, when EFTA was established as 
a loose intergovernmental organization, this would never have been thought possible.
In conclusion, it appears that with the European Council Summit in Edinburgh, the first battle 
over the future desig of the European Community has been won by the wideners'. It is most 
unlikely, however, that Edinburgh has brought to an end the debate on deepening versus 
widening. Once the first EFTA countries, including possibly Norway, have entered the 
European Community, new applications from other parts of Europe may well have been added 
to the waiting list. Along with the ongoing accession negotiations they would continue to feed 
the debate. Moreover, it is a clear sign of times to come that the composition of the new 
Commission has seen the EC's external relations portfolio divide to include a Commissioner 
responsible for its future enlargement. The wideners' may have won the first battle, but one 
battle does not win a war.  
_____________________
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